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Loss Aversion 
Loss aversion is one of the most important concepts in behavioral economics 
(Camerer, 2008). It is consistent with a wide range of empirical findings such as the 
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1990), status quo bias (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988), equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), labor 
supply of cabdrivers (Camerer et al. 1997), disposition effects in condominium sales 
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001) and animal behavior (Chen et al. 2006) to name a few. 
Loss aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary 
payoffs (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Köbberling and Wakker, 2005; Schmidt and 
Zank, 2005). However, people often incur losses that may not be measurable in 
monetary terms (e.g. loss of a close friend or a relative, loss of faith, reputation or 
prestige, loss of a sports title, loss of animal species etc). This paper extends the notion 
of loss aversion to decision problems where outcomes (consequences) may not be 
measurable in monetary terms.  
Numerous experimental studies demonstrate that people generally have fuzzy 
preferences over lotteries, i.e. they choose in a probabilistic manner (e.g. Camerer, 1989; 
Hey and Orme, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 1998). Therefore, this paper also extends the 
notion of loss aversion to allow for the possibility of fuzzy preferences.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 defines comparative loss aversion 
in the context of an arbitrary outcome set. Section 2 considers the implications of this 
definition for expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and rank-
dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1981). Section 3 extends the notion of loss aversion 
to a more general setup where people have fuzzy preferences over lotteries. Section 4 
discusses probabilistic loss aversion in the context of different models of probabilistic 
choice. Section 5 defines absolute loss aversion. Section 6 concludes. 
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1. Comparative Loss Aversion 
Let X denote a finite set of outcomes (consequences) that contains at least two 
elements. We will treat X as an arbitrary abstract set, which is not necessarily a subset of 
Euclidean space n. Let X-⊂X be a nonempty proper subset of X. The elements x-∈X- are 
called losses and they can be, for example, “loss of $100”, “loss of a key chain”, “loss 
of faith”, “loss of virginity” etc. Let X+ ≡ X \ X- denote the complement of X-. The 
elements x+∈X+ are called gains and they can be, for example, “gain of $200”, “gain in 
experience”, “weight gain” etc.  
A lottery L: X → [0,1] is a probability distribution on X, i.e. it delivers an 
outcome x∈X with a probability L(x) ∈ [0,1] and ∑x∈X L(x)=1. The set of all lotteries is 
denoted by ℒ. Let L+ : X → [0,1] denote a loss-free lottery that yields only gains with a 
positive probability i.e. ( ) 1x X L x+ + + +∈ =∑  and L+(x-)=0 for any x-∈X-. Let ℒ+ ⊂ ℒ be the 
set of all such loss-free lotteries. 
In this and the next section we consider a “traditional” decision maker who has a 
unique binary preference relation  on ℒ. As customary, we will use the sign  to 
denote the asymmetric component of , and the sign ~ to denote the symmetric 
component of . We will consider two individuals: an individual ♀ characterized by a 
preference relation ♀ and an individual ♂ characterized by a preference relation ♂. 
Definition 1 An individual ♀ is strictly more loss averse than an individual ♂ if  
a) L+ ♂ L implies L+ ♀ L for all L+∈ℒ+ and all L∈ℒ; 
b) L+ ~♂ L implies L+ ♀ L for all L+∈ℒ+ and all L∈ℒ;   
c) there exist L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ such that L+ ~♂ L and L+ ♀ L. 
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According to Definition 1, a more loss averse individual strictly prefers a loss-
free lottery over another lottery whenever a less loss averse individual does so as well. 
In addition, a more loss averse individual weakly prefers a loss-free lottery over another 
lottery whenever a less loss averse individual is exactly indifferent between the two.  
This definition of the more-loss-averse-than relation between individuals is quite 
general. Specifically, Definition 1 does not require that lottery outcomes are measurable 
in real numbers. It also does not require that individual preferences are represented by a 
specific decision theory (e.g. prospect theory). In particular, comparative loss aversion is 
defined in terms of observable preferences and not as a property of an unobservable 
function (e.g. a value function in prospect theory) that represents these preferences. 
If an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an individual ♂, this does not imply 
that an individual ♀ is also more risk averse than an individual ♂. Specifically, it is 
possible that a less loss averse individual ♂ strictly prefers a sure loss of x-∈X- over a 
lottery L∈ℒ and at the same time a more loss averse individual ♀ strictly prefers L over 
a degenerate (risk-free) lottery that yields x- for sure.1 This implies that an individual ♀ 
is not always more risk averse than an individual ♂ (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2008a). Similarly, 
a more risk averse individual is not necessarily a more loss averse individual as well. 
Proposition 1 If an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an individual ♂, or 
vice versa, then  
a) L+ ♀ M+ if and only if L+ ♂ M+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+;  
b) L+ ~♀ M+ if and only if L+ ~♂ M+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
                                                 
1 However, Definition 1 implies that if a less loss averse individual ♂ strictly prefers a sure gain of x+∈X+ 
over a lottery L∈ℒ then a more loss averse individual ♀ does so as well and if an individual ♂ is exactly 
indifferent between the two then an individual ♀ weakly prefers the sure gain of x+ over L. In other 
words, an individual ♀ is more risk averse than an individual ♂ in the domain of gains. 
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Proposition 1 is an intuitive implication of Definition 1. We can unambiguously 
rank two individuals in terms of their loss preferences only if they have identical 
preferences over loss-free alternatives (gain lotteries). If the two individuals do not have 
the same preferences in choice without any losses, one of them may choose a specific 
loss-free lottery because it is her most preferred alternative and not because she is 
averse to losses. Thus, to have a meaningful concept of comparative loss aversion, we 
need to consider individuals with identical preferences over the set of loss-free lotteries. 
2. Loss Aversion in Different Decision Theories 
Let us first consider comparative loss aversion in the context of expected utility 
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). In expected utility theory there exists an 
utility function u:X→ that is unique up to a positive linear transformation, such that  
(1) L  M  if and only if   ∑x∈X L(x)u(x) ≥ ∑x∈X M(x)u(x), 
for any two lotteries L, M ∈ ℒ. According to formula (1), a lottery L is weakly preferred 
over a lottery M if and only if the expected utility of L is greater than or equal to the 
expected utility of M.  
The following result follows immediately from Proposition 1.  
Corollary 1 If an expected utility maximizer ♀ with utility function u♀:X→ is 
more loss averse than an expected utility maximizer ♂ with utility function u♂:X→, 
then there exist a>0 and b∈ such that u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+. 
Corollary 1 simply states that whenever two individuals can be ranked in terms 
of loss preferences, they must have the same utility function in the domain of gains, up 
to a positive linear transformation.  
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Proposition 2 An expected utility maximizer ♀ with utility function u♀:X→ is 
more loss averse than an expected utility maximizer ♂ with utility function u♂:X→ if 
and only if there exist a>0 and b∈ such that 
a) u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+; 
b) u♀(x-) ≤ au♂(x-) + b for all x-∈X-; 
c) there exists a loss x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix.  
Proposition 2 effectively states that an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an 
individual ♂ if and only if we can normalize the utility function of an individual ♀ for 
two arbitrary gains so that ♀’s normalized utility function coincides with ♂’s utility 
function in the domain of gains and ♀’s normalized utility of any loss x-∈X- is less than 
or equal to ♂’s  utility of x- (and it is strictly less for at least one loss x-∈X-).  
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2 when X+ is the set of positive real numbers + 
and X- is the set of negative real numbers -. 
 
a+b
1au♂(x)+b 
b
u♀(x) 
u♂(x) 
0 x 
Figure 1 An expected utility maximizer ♀ with utility function u♀(x) is more loss 
averse than an expected utility maximizer ♂ with utility function u♂(x) 
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Let us now apply the concept of comparative loss aversion in the context of 
rank-dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1981). In rank-dependent utility theory there 
exists an utility function u:X→ that is unique up to a positive linear transformation, 
and a unique strictly increasing probability weighting function w:[0,1]→[0,1] with 
w(0)=0 and w(1)=1, such that  
(2) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
    if and only if   
,
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
L M u x w L y w L y
u x w M y w M y
∈ ∈∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈∈ ≥ >
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ≥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≥ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑

 
for any lotteries L, M ∈ ℒ. The following result follows immediately from Proposition 1. 
Corollary 2 If a rank-dependent utility maximizer ♀ with an utility function 
u♀:X→ and a probability weighting function w♀:[0,1]→[0,1] is more loss averse than a 
rank-dependent utility maximizer ♂ with an utility function u♂:X→ and a probability 
weighting function w♂:[0,1]→[0,1], then w♀(p) = w♂(p) for all p∈[0,1] and there exist 
a>0 and b∈ such that u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+. 
Recall that an unambiguous ranking of two individuals according to their loss 
attitudes is possible only if the two individuals share the same preferences over loss-free 
lotteries (Proposition 1). In the context of rank-dependent utility theory this implies the 
following. We can rank two rank-dependent utility maximizers according to their loss 
attitudes only if the two individuals have the same probability weighting function and 
the same utility function in the domain of gains, up to a positive linear transformation 
(Corollary 2). Note that Corollary 2 implies that the two rank-dependent utility 
maximizers have the same ranking of gains in terms of their desirability. 
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Proposition 3 A rank-dependent utility maximizer ♀ with an utility function 
u♀:X→ and a probability weighting function w♀:[0,1]→[0,1] is more loss averse than a 
rank-dependent utility maximizer ♂ with an utility function u♂:X→ and a probability 
weighting function w♂:[0,1]→[0,1] if and only if there exist a>0 and b∈ such that 
a) w♀(p) = w♂(p) for all p∈[0,1]; 
b) u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+; 
c) u♀(x-) ≤ au♂(x-) + b for all x-∈X-; 
d) there exists a loss x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
Note that Proposition 3 does not require that the two rank-dependent utility 
maximizers have the same ranking of losses in terms of their desirability. 
Proposition 3 characterizes the concept of loss aversion within a rank-dependent 
utility theory. In particular, Proposition 3 shows that loss aversion is entirely captured 
by the curvature of the utility function and it is not related to the shape of the probability 
weighting function. The restrictions on the curvature of the utility function, which are 
required for one individual to be strictly more loss averse than another individual, are 
exactly the same as in expected utility theory (cf. Proposition 2). Namely, the two 
individuals should have the same utility function in the domain of gains (up to a positive 
linear transformation) and a more loss averse individual should have an utility function 
that lies below the corresponding normalized utility function of a less loss averse 
individual in the domain of losses. Notably, these formal restrictions b)-d) in 
Proposition 3 are quite similar to the intuitive ideas of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
who pioneered the concept of loss aversion in behavioral economics. 
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3. Probabilistic Loss Aversion 
Numerous experimental studies find that people do not always choose the same 
alternative when presented with exactly the same decision problem on two separate 
occasions within a short period of time (e.g. Camerer, 1989; Hey and Orme, 1994; 
Loomes and Sugden, 1998). In general, people often make contradictory choices if none 
of the lotteries transparently dominates other alternatives. In this section we will extend 
Definition 1 to a more general setup where people may choose in a probabilistic manner. 
In the remainder of this paper we assume that the primitive of choice is a binary 
choice probability function P:ℒ¯ℒ→[0,1], which is also known as a fuzzy preference 
relation (e.g. Zimmerman et al., 1984). Notation P(L,M) denotes probability that an 
individual chooses lottery L ∈ ℒ over lottery M ∈ ℒ in a direct binary choice. For any L, 
M ∈ ℒ, L ≠ M, probability P(L,M) is observable from the relative frequency with which 
an individual chooses L when asked to choose repeatedly between L and M. We 
consider two individuals: an individual ♀ and an individual ♂ characterized by binary 
choice probability functions P♀(.,.) and P♂(.,.) correspondingly.  
Definition 2 An individual ♀ is probabilistically more loss averse than an 
individual ♂ if P♀(L+,L)≥P♂(L+,L) for all L+∈ℒ+ and all L∈ℒ and there exist at least one 
loss-free lottery L+∈ℒ+ and one lottery L∈ℒ such that P♀(L+,L)>P♂(L+,L). 
Definition 2 simply states that a more loss averse individual is always at least as 
likely to choose a loss-free lottery over any other lottery as a less loss averse individual. 
Definition 2 of the more-loss-averse-than relation between individuals is very general. 
In particular, lottery outcomes may not be measurable in real numbers. We also do not 
require that fuzzy preferences over lotteries are represented by a specific model of 
probabilistic choice. Thus, Definition 2 applies to very distinct models of probabilistic 
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choice, e.g. when people have multiple preference relations on ℒ (Loomes and Sugden, 
1995) or when people have a unique preference relation on ℒ but they make random 
errors (Hey and Orme, 1994; Blavatskyy, 2007). Last but not least, Definition 2 is more 
compact than Definition 1. 
By replacing lottery L∈ℒ in the first part of Definition 2 with a loss-free lottery 
M+∈ℒ+, we immediately arrive at the following result. 
Corollary 3 If an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an individual ♂, or vice 
versa, then P♀(L+, M+)=P♂(L+, M+) for all L+, M+∈ℒ+.  
According to Corollary 3, the ranking of individuals in terms of their loss 
attitudes is possible only if they choose in identical manner between loss-free lotteries. 
If this is not the case, heterogeneous loss attitudes are confounded with heterogonous 
tastes over loss-free lotteries and no clear comparison of individuals in terms of relative 
loss aversion can be made. 
4. Loss Aversion in Different Models of Probabilistic 
Choice 
One of the simplest models of probabilistic choice is the constant error/tremble 
model. Harless and Camerer (1994) argue that people have a unique preference relation 
on ℒ but they do not always choose their preferred lottery. With a constant probability 
τ∈[0,0.5] a tremble occurs and people choose a less preferred alternative (for instance, 
due to a lapse of concentration). Specifically, in a constant error/tremble model there 
exists an utility function u:X→ that is unique up to a linear transformation, such that  
(3) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
, 0.5,
1 ,
x X x X
x X x X
x X x X
L x u x M x u x
P L M L x u x M x u x
L x u x M x u x
τ
τ
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
⎧ <⎪⎪= =⎨⎪ − >⎪⎩
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
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for any two lotteries L, M ∈ ℒ and a probability τ∈[0,0.5]. The following result follows 
directly from the proof of Proposition 2. 
Corollary 4 An individual ♀ with utility function u♀:X→ and the probability 
of a tremble τ♀ is probabilistically more loss averse than an individual ♂ with utility 
function u♂:X→ and the probability of a tremble τ♂ if and only if τ♂ = τ♀ and there exist 
a>0 and b∈ such that 
a) u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+; 
b) u♀(x-) ≤ au♂(x-) + b for all x-∈X-; 
c) there exists a loss x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b. 
Let us now consider probabilistic loss aversion in the context of a strong utility 
model (e.g. Luce and Suppes, 1965). In this model there exists an utility function 
u:X→ that is unique up to a positive linear transformation, and a strictly increasing 
function :→[0,1], which is unique up to a positive dimensional constant and satisfies 
(v)+(-v)=1 for all v∈, such that  
(4) P(L,M) =  ( ∑x∈X L(x)u(x) – ∑x∈X M(x)u(x) )  
for any two lotteries L, M∈ℒ.  
Function (.) captures the sensitivity of binary choice probabilities to differences 
in the expected utility of the two alternatives that an individual needs to choose from. If 
function (.) is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution with zero 
mean and constant standard deviation, model (4) becomes the Fechner model of random 
errors (Fechner, 1860; Hey and Orme, 1994). If function (.) is the distribution function 
of the logistic distribution, model (4) becomes Luce choice model (Luce, 1959). 
Blavatskyy (2008) provides axiomatic characterization of the choice rule (4). 
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Proposition 4 A strong utility maximizer ♀ characterized by a pair of functions 
(u♀, ♀) is probabilistically more loss averse than a strong utility maximizer ♂ charac-
terized by a pair of functions (u♂, ♂) if there exist a>0 and b∈ such that 
a) u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+; 
b) u♀(x-) ≤ au♂(x-) + b for all x-∈X-; 
c) ♀(av) = ♂(v) for all v∈[-δ, δ], where ( ) ( )max min
x Xx X
u x u xδ
+ ++ +
+ +∈∈
= −♂ ♂ ; 
d) ♀(av) ≥ ♂(v) for all v∈(δ, Δ], where ( ) ( )max min
x Xx X
u x u x
− −+ +
+ −∈∈
Δ = −♂ ♂ ;2 
e) either there exists a loss x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b or there exists 
v∈(δ, Δ] such that ♀(av) > ♂(v) or both. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
Proposition 4 shows that in a strong utility model loss aversion is related both to 
the curvature of the utility function u(.) and the shape of the sensitivity function (.). On 
the one hand, an individual ♀ can be more loss averse than an individual ♂ if they have 
the same utility function in the domain of gains (up to a positive linear transformation) 
but ♀’s utility function lies below ♂’s normalized utility function in the domain of 
losses. On the other hand, an individual ♀ can be more loss averse than an individual ♂ 
if they have the same sensitivity function in the neighborhood of zero (up to a positive 
dimensional constant) but individual ♀ is more sensitive to large differences in utility. 
Interestingly, a strong utility model allows individual ranking in terms of relative 
loss aversion but not in terms of relative risk aversion. Wilcox (2008) and Blavatskyy 
(2008a) show that risk aversion cannot be defined within a strong utility model. Thus, 
there are models where loss aversion is well defined even though risk aversion is not. 
                                                 
2 Note that condition d) is equivalent to ♀(av) ≤ ♂(v) for all v∈(-Δ,-δ] due to the skew-symmetric 
property of the sensitivity function (.). 
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5. Absolute Loss Aversion  
So far we considered only comparative loss aversion. To measure absolute loss 
aversion, we need to fix one binary choice probability function PLN : ℒ¯ℒ → [0,1]. An 
individual is called loss neutral if she has the binary choice probability function PLN(.,.). 
An individual is called loss averse if she is more loss averse (according to Definition 2) 
than the loss neutral individual. Similarly, an individual is called loss seeking or loss 
loving if the loss neutral individual is more loss averse than this individual.  
Notice that the concept of absolute loss aversion depends on an ad hoc selection 
of a loss neutral binary choice probability function PLN(.,.).3 This is similar to our 
temperature measurement that requires an arbitrary selection of zero temperature (e.g. 
the triple point of water in the Celsius scale or absolute zero in the Kelvin scale). 
Similarly, our time measurement also requires an ad hoc selection of an epochal date 
(e.g. the incarnation of Jesus in the Gregorian calendar, the creation of the world in the 
Hebrew calendar or the immigration of Muhammad in the Islamic calendar). 
In a special case when lotteries have only monetary outcomes and people have 
deterministic preferences, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) arbitrary selected a loss 
neutral preference relation so that a loss neutral individual is exactly indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting a symmetric bet that yields a 50%-50% chance of either a loss 
of –x or a gain of x, for all x∈+. In other words, loss aversion is defined as aversion to 
symmetric 50%-50% lotteries. Several later studies also adopted this convention (e.g. 
Schmidt and Zank, 2005). However, it is not clear how this natural “normalization” can 
be extended to a more general case when outcomes are not measurable in real numbers. 
                                                 
3 The definition of risk aversion also requires a priori “normalization” of risk neutral preferences (e.g. 
Epstein, 1999; Blavatskyy, 2008a). Similarly, in order to define uncertainty aversion we need an arbitrary 
definition of uncertainty neutrality (e.g. Epstein, 1999). 
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6. Conclusion  
Loss aversion is a fundamental concept in behavioral economics. However, it is 
traditionally defined only in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper 
extends the definition of loss aversion to a more general setup where outcomes are not 
necessarily measurable in real numbers and people do not necessarily have a unique 
preference relation over lotteries, i.e. they may choose in a probabilistic manner. 
Specifically, an individual ♀ is said to be probabilistically more loss averse than an 
individual ♂ if in any decision problem an individual ♀ chooses a loss-free lottery (that 
yields only gains with a positive probability) at least as frequently as does individual ♂. 
This paper shows that the above definition of comparative loss aversion has very 
intuitive implications for well-known decision theories such as expected utility theory 
and rank-dependent utility theory as well as for popular models of probabilistic choice 
such as the constant error/tremble model, the Fechner model of random errors and Luce 
choice model. In particular, in these models loss aversion is related to the curvature of 
the utility function. If two individuals can be ranked in terms of their loss preferences, 
then they have the same utility function in the domain of gains (up to a positive linear 
transformation) but the utility function of a more loss averse individual lies below the 
normalized utility function of a less loss averse individual in the domain of losses. 
In a strong utility model, loss aversion may be also driven by the curvature of 
the sensitivity function—a more loss averse individual may be more sensitive to large 
differences in expected utility of the two lotteries that are compared. Interestingly, 
comparative loss aversion is well-defined in a strong utility model, even though 
comparative risk aversion is not. This highlights an important point that stronger loss 
aversion does not necessarily imply stronger risk aversion, or vice versa.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Consider an individual ♀ who is more loss averse than an individual ♂.  
a) According to Definition 1, if L+ ♂ M+ then L+ ♀ M+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+.  
Let us now assume that there exist two lotteries L+, M+∈ℒ+ such that L+ ♀ M+ 
but M+ ♂ L+. If M+ ♂ L+ then Definition 1 implies that M+ ♀ L+. However, this 
contradicts to our assumption that L+ ♀ M+. If M+ ~♂ L+ then Definition 1 implies that 
M+ ♀ L+. Again, this contradicts to our assumption that L+ ♀ M+. Therefore, it must be 
the case that L+ ♀ M+ if and only if L+ ♂ M+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+. 
b) According to Definition 1, if L+ ~♂ M+ then L+ ♀ M+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+. 
Moreover, if M+ ~♂ L+ then M+ ♀ L+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+. Hence, if L+ ~♂ M+ then it must 
be the case that L+ ~♀ M+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+. 
Let us now assume that there exist two lotteries L+, M+∈ℒ+ such that L+ ~♀ M+ 
but M+ ≁♂ L+. If M+ ♂ L+ then Definition 1 implies that M+ ♀ L+. However, this 
contradicts to our assumption that L+ ~♀ M+. Similarly, if L+ ♂ M+ then L+ ♀ M+ due to 
Definition 1 and the analogous contradiction arises. Therefore, L+ ~♀ M+ if and only if 
L+ ~♂ M+ for all L+, M+∈ℒ+. 
Similarly, we can prove that Proposition 1 holds when an individual ♂ is more 
loss averse than an individual ♀. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
We will first prove that if conditions a)-c) hold then an individual ♀ is more loss 
averse than an individual ♂. Consider two arbitrary lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ. We will 
first prove that L+ ♂ L implies L+ ♀ L. Condition (1) implies that L+ ♂ L if and only if  
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(5) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x X x Xu x L x u x L x+ + + + +∈ ∈>∑ ∑♂ ♂ .  
We can rearrange (5) into 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x X x Xu x L x L x u x L x+ + − −+ + + + − −∈ ∈− >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑♂ ♂ .  
Furthermore, we can multiply both sides of (6) on a positive constant a>0 and 
add ( ) ( ) ( )x X x Xb L x L x b L x+ + − −+ + + −∈ ∈− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  to both sides of (6), b∈. This results in 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x X x Xau x b L x L x au x b L x+ + − −+ + + + − −∈ ∈+ − > +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑♂ ♂ .  
If part a) of Proposition 2 holds then there exist a>0 and b∈ such that u♀(x+) = 
au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+. Hence, we can rewrite (7) as 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x X x Xu x L x L x au x b L x+ + − −+ + + + − −∈ ∈− > +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑♀ ♂ .  
If part b) of Proposition 2 holds then u♀(x-) ≤ au♂(x-) + b for all x-∈X-. Thus, we 
can rewrite (8) as 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x X x Xu x L x L x u x L x+ + − −+ + + + − −∈ ∈− >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑♀ ♀ .  
Finally, we can rearrange (9) into  
(10) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x X x Xu x L x u x L x+ + + + +∈ ∈>∑ ∑♀ ♀ ,  
which holds if and only if L+ ♀ L due to (1). Hence, L+ ♂ L implies L+ ♀ L for all 
L+∈ℒ+ and all L∈ℒ if parts a) and b) of Proposition 2 hold. 
To prove that L+ ~♂ L implies L+ ♀ L for all L+∈ℒ+ and all L∈ℒ we just need to 
replace the sign “>” with the sign “=” in (5)-(8) and with the sign “≥” in (9)-(10). 
Let us now prove that there exist L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ such that L+ ~♂ L and L+ ♀ L. 
If part c) of Proposition 2 holds then there exists x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b. Let 
y,z∈X+ be two gains such that u♂(x-)<u♂(y)<u♂(z). Let L+ be a lottery that yields y for sure 
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and let L be a lottery that yields x- with probability p and z with probability 1-p. 
Obviously, there exists a probability p such that  
(11) u♂(y) = pu♂(x-) + (1-p)u♂(z).  
If (11) holds then condition (1) implies that L+ ~♂ L. However, if we multiply 
both sides of (11) on a>0 and add b∈ to both sides of (11) we obtain 
(12) u♀(y) = p(au♂(x-) + b) + (1-p)u♀(z),  
where we used the fact that u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+ due to part a) of 
Proposition 2. Since u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b, then it must be the case that u♀(y) > pu♀(x-) + 
(1-p)u♀(z). Hence, L+ ♀ L due to condition (1). In other words, we constructed two 
lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ such that L+ ~♂ L but L+ ♀ L. 
To summarize, if parts a)-c) of Proposition 2 hold then conditions a)-c) of 
Definition 1 are satisfied i.e. an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an individual ♂. 
Let us now prove the necessity of parts a)-c) of Proposition 2. If an individual ♀ is more 
loss averse than an individual ♂ then part a) of Proposition 2 holds due to Corollary 1. 
Suppose that an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an individual ♂ but there 
is a loss x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) > au♂(x-) + b. In such case, for the two lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and 
L∈ℒ that we constructed above we must have L+ ~♂ L but L ♀ L+. However, this 
contradicts to condition b) in Definition 1 i.e. in this case an individual ♀ is not more 
loss averse than an individual ♂. Thus, part b) of Proposition 2 must hold for any x-∈X-.  
Finally, if part c) of Proposition 2 does not hold, i.e. u♀(x-) = au♂(x-) + b for all  
x-∈X-, then L+ ~♂ L implies L+ ~♀ L for all L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ due to (1) and condition c) of 
Definition 1 cannot be satisfied. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. 
We will first prove the sufficiency of conditions a)-d) in Proposition 3. Consider 
two arbitrary lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ. We will first prove that part a) of Definition 1 
must hold i.e. L+ ♂ L implies L+ ♀ L.  
Condition (2) implies that L+ ♂ L if and only if  
(13) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
u x w L y w L y
u x w L y w L y
+ + + ++ + + + + +
∈ ∈+ + + + +∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈∈ ≥ >
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞> −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂
 
For any a>0 and b∈ we can rewrite condition (13) as follows  
(14) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y X
u y u x u
au x b w L y w L y
au x b w L y w L y
au x b w L y w L y
+ + + ++ + + + + +
+ + + ++ + + + + +
−
∈ ∈+ + + + +∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈+ + +∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈− ≥
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − >⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞> + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞+ + −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ( ) ( ) .x X y u x− − −∈ >
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ♂ ♂
 
If part a) of Proposition 3 holds, then the two individuals ♀ and ♂ have identical 
probability weighting functions. If part b) of Proposition 3 holds, there exist a>0 and 
b∈ such that u♀(x+) = au♂(x+) + b for all x+∈X+ and we can rewrite (14) as follows 
(15) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y X
u y u x u y u x
u x w L y w L y
u x w L y w L y
au x b w L y w L y
+ + + ++ + + + + +
+ + + ++ + + + + +
− −
∈ ∈+ + + + +∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈+ + +∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈− ≥ >
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞> − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀
♂ ♀ ♀ .x X− −∈
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
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Let z-∈X- be the most desirable loss for an individual ♀ i.e. u♀(z-) ≥ u♀(x-) for all 
x-∈X-. Let Z-⊂X- be the set of all losses that an individual ♂ finds at least as good as z- 
i.e. u♂(x-) ≥ u♂(z-) for all x-∈Z-. If part c) of Proposition 3 holds then we can rewrite 
(16) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
y X y Xx Z u y u x u y u x
y X y Xx Z u y u x u y u x
y X y X
u y u z u y u z
au x b w L y w L y
au z b w L y w L y
au z b w L y w L y
− − − −
− − − −
− −
∈ ∈−∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈−∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈− ≥ >
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − ≥⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≥ + − =⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♀ ♀
♂ ♀ ♀
♂ ♀ ♀
♂ ♀ ♀
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .
y X y X
u y u z u y u z
y X y Xx Z u y u x u y u x
u z w L y w L y
u x w L y w L y
− −
− − − −
∈ ∈− ≥ >
∈ ∈−∈ ≥ >
≥⎥⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≥ − ≥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≥ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
♂ ♂ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀
 
We can repeat the above argument for a smaller set of losses X-\Z- and so forth. 
Since the set X- is finite, we then arrive at the result 
(17)  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
au x b w L y w L y
u x w L y w L y
− − − −
− − − −
∈ ∈−∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈−∈ ≥ >
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − ≥⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≥ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♂ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀
 
Using (17) we can rewrite (15) as follows 
(18) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
y X y Xx X u y u x u y u x
u x w L y w L y
u x w L y w L y
+ + + ++ + + + + +
∈ ∈+ + + + +∈ ≥ >
∈ ∈∈ ≥ >
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞> −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀
 
If (18) holds then L+ ♀ L due to (2). Hence, part a) of Definition 1 must hold. 
To prove that part b) of Definition 1 must hold i.e.  L+ ~♂ L implies L+ ♀ L for 
all L+∈ℒ+ and all L∈ℒ we just need to replace the sign “>” with the sign “=” in (13)-(15) 
and with the sign “≥” in (18).  
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Finally, let us prove that part c) of Definition 1 must hold i.e. there exist L+∈ℒ+ 
and L∈ℒ such that L+ ~♂ L and L+ ♀ L. If part d) of Proposition 3 holds then there exists 
x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b. Let y,z∈X+ be two gains such that u♂(x-)<u♂(y)<u♂(z). 
Let L+ be a lottery that yields y for sure and let L be a lottery that yields x- with 
probability 1-p and z with probability p. Since function w♂(p) is strictly increasing in p 
with w♂(0)=0 and w♂(1)=1, there exists a probability p such that  
(19) u♂(y) = (1- w♂(p))u♂(x-) + w♂(p)u♂(z).  
If (19) holds then L+ ~♂ L due to (2). If parts a) and b) of Proposition 3 hold, we 
can rewrite (19) as follows 
(20) u♀(y) = (1- w♀(p))(au♂(x-) + b) + w♀(p)u♀(z).  
Since u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b, then (20) implies u♀(y) > (1- w♀(p))u♀(x-) + w♀(p)u♀(z) 
i.e. L+ ♀ L due to (2). In other words, we constructed two lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ such 
that L+ ~♂ L but L+ ♀ L. 
Hence, if parts a)-d) of Proposition 3 hold then conditions a)-c) of Definition 1 
are satisfied i.e. an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an individual ♂. Let us now 
prove the necessity of parts a)-d) of Proposition 3. If an individual ♀ is more loss averse 
than an individual ♂ then parts a) and b) of Proposition 3 hold due to Corollary 2. 
Suppose that an individual ♀ is more loss averse than an individual ♂ but there 
is a loss x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) > au♂(x-) + b. In such case, for the two lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and 
L∈ℒ that we constructed above we must have L+ ~♂ L but L ♀ L+. However, this 
contradicts to condition b) in Definition 1 i.e. in this case an individual ♀ is not more 
loss averse than an individual ♂. Thus, part c) of Proposition 3 must hold for any x-∈X-.  
Finally, if part d) of Proposition 3 does not hold, i.e. u♀(x-) = au♂(x-) + b for all  
x-∈X-, then L+ ~♂ L implies L+ ~♀ L for all L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ due to (2) and condition c) of 
Definition 1 cannot be satisfied. Q.E.D. 
 24
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Consider two arbitrary lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ. Let us prove that if conditions 
a)-d) of Proposition 4 are satisfied then P♀(L+,L)≥P♂(L+,L). Equation (4) implies that 
(21) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), x X x XP L L L x u x L x u xϕ + ++ + + +∈ ∈= −∑ ∑♀ ♀ ♀ ♀ .  
If condition a) of Proposition 4 holds, we can rewrite equation (21) as follows 
(22) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), x X x XP L L L x L x au x b L x u xϕ + + − −+ + + + + − −∈ ∈= − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑♀ ♀ ♂ ♀ .  
If condition b) of Proposition 4 holds and given that function ♀(.) is strictly 
increasing, we can rewrite equation (22) as follows 
(23) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), x X x XP L L L x L x au x b L x au x bϕ + + − −+ + + + + − −∈ ∈≥ − + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑♀ ♀ ♂ ♂ .  
Inequality (23) can be rearranged into 
(24) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), x X x XP L L a L x u x L x u xϕ + ++ + + +∈ ∈⎡ ⎤≥ −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑♀ ♀ ♂ ♂ .  
If conditions c) and d) of Proposition 4 are satisfied then we can rewrite (24) as 
(25) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), x X x XP L L L x u x L x u xϕ + ++ + + +∈ ∈≥ −∑ ∑♀ ♂ ♂ ♂ .  
The last inequality (25) simply states that P♀(L+,L)≥P♂(L+,L) due to equation (4). 
Let us now prove that if conditions a)-e) of Proposition 4 are satisfied then there 
exist two lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ such that P♀(L+,L)>P♂(L+,L). According to condition 
e) of Proposition 4, at least one of the following conditions must hold: 1) there exists a 
loss x-∈X- such that u♀(x-) < au♂(x-) + b; 2) there exists v∈(δ, Δ] such that ♀(av) > ♂(v).  
If condition 1) holds, then for any lottery L∈ℒ that yields such an outcome x-∈X- 
with a positive probability inequalities (23)-(25) hold as strict inequalities and we have 
P♀(L+,L)>P♂(L+,L). If condition 2) holds, then for any two lotteries L+∈ℒ+ and L∈ℒ 
such that ∑x∈X L+(x)u♂(x) – ∑x∈X L(x)u♂(x) = v, inequality (25) holds as strict inequality 
and we have again P♀(L+,L)>P♂(L+,L). Q.E.D. 
